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PAYING THE "TRADITIONAL PRICE" OF DISCLOSURE: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT REJECTS LIMITED WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,
951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991)
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that a
corporation waives its attorney-client privilege2 when it reveals confiden-
tial information to investigatory government agencies.3
In Westinghouse, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") and its
National Power Corporation ("NPC")4 sued Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration ("Westinghouse"), 5 alleging that Westinghouse had obtained a
1. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
2. The attorney-client privilege protects qualified confidential communications between an at-
torney and client. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (providing background discussion of
the attorney-client privilege).
3. In so doing, the Third Circuit rejected the limited waiver rule, which allows corporations to
disclose privileged information to investigatory government agencies and maintain the privilege,
even after such disclosure. In effect, this rule circumvents the traditional waiver rule, which pro-
vides that when confidential information is disclosed to a third party, the attorney-client privilege is
waived. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the traditional
waiver rule); see infra text accompanying note 48 (definition of the limited waiver rule).
The Westinghouse court also held that a firm which voluntarily disclosed an attorney's work prod-
uct to investigatory government agencies waived any protection afforded by the work-product doc-
trine as against all other adversaries. 951 F.2d at 1429. While both the work-product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege safeguard confidential information to facilitate the trial process, the two
concepts are distinguishable. The attorney-client privilege is essentially a subcategory of the work-
product doctrine. The attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications between
the client and the attorney, while the work-product doctrine is broader. The work-product doctrine
promotes the adversary system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from his
opponent's discovery attempts. For example, work product may include information obtained from
persons other than the client, but the attorney-client privilege covers only information gathered from
the client. Moreover, while only the client may waive the attorney-client privilege, an attorney may
forfeit his or her work product. In addition, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
doctrine is not designed to protect the interests of an individual. Rather, it is designed solely to
benefit the adversary system itself. See Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection,
Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 922-23, 943 (1983). See also United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co. (In re MCI Communications Corp.), 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
4. The National Power Corporation is the Philippine government agency responsible for elec-
tric power generation. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362,
1364 (D.N.J. 1989).
5. The defendants (collectively referred to as "Westinghouse") were Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, Westinghouse International Projects Company, a wholly-
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large power plant contract 6 in the Philippines by bribing a friend of for-
mer President Ferdinand Marcos. 7 The Republic further contended that
Westinghouse had tortiously interfered with the fiduciary duties that
Marcos owed to the Philippine citizens and to the NPC.8
During discovery, the Republic sought certain documents9 generated
by a Westinghouse internal investigation.10 Westinghouse had disclosed
these documents to the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC")" and
the Department of Justice ("DOJ")'2 in order to cooperate with the
owned subsidiary of Westinghouse, and Burns & Roe Enterprises, Inc. ("Burns & Roe"), a New
Jersey architecture/engineering corporation. Id.
6. The contract involved building a 600-megawatt nuclear power plant in Bagac, Bataan
which commenced in 1976. Id. In the summer of 1973, then-President Ferdinand E. Marcos an-
nounced his government's decision to build the plant. Id. Many foreign companies, including West-
inghouse and Bums & Roe, submitted bids for the lucrative project. Id.
7. Id. at 1365. The 15-count complaint alleged "breach of contract, fraud, tortious interfer-
ence with fiduciary duties, negligence, civil conspiracy, RICO violations, antitrust violations, and
various pendant state claims." Id. at 1364. The Republic alleged that in order to obtain a piece of
the contract, both Westinghouse and Burns & Roe retained a special sales representative ("SSR"),
who had influence in the presidential palace. Id. This SSR, Herminico Disini, a Philippine business-
man and close personal friend of Marcos, allegedly offered Marcos a "piece of the action" in order to
obtain his endorsement of the bidders. Id. at 1365. Disini agreed to promote Westinghouse and
Burns & Roe's interest with the NPC. The contract with Disini required Westinghouse to pay
Disini, through various corporations he owned, three percent of the total contract price. The Re-
public further contended that Westinghouse and Burns & Roe knew that Disini was passing these
commission payments to Marcos. Id.
8. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1991). Both
the Republic and the NPC sought rescission of the contracts and damages. Id.
9. The Republic requested that Westinghouse turn over the documents it disclosed to the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Department of Justice ('DOJ") during investiga-
tions conducted by the two agencies. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 132
F.R.D. 384, 386 (D.N.J. 1990). See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these investigations.
10. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1417 (3d Cir.
1991). In March 1978, following the commencement of an SEC investigation, Westinghouse chose
to participate in the SEC Voluntary Disclosure Program and conduct a self-investigation. Id. See
infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for discussion of the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.
Westinghouse retained a law firm to investigate whether company officials had made improper pay-
ments. During the investigation, the law firm reported its findings in two letters. 951 F.2d at 1418.
11. The SEC investigation followed press reports concerning Westinghouse's alleged bribery of
foreign officials during the Philippine nuclear plant negotiations. Id. Upon Westinghouse's request,
the law firm that conducted the investigation revealed one of its reports to the SEC and orally
presented its findings to the agency. The law firm disclosed only the report, not the findings upon
which they based the presentation and report. In addition, the SEC agreed not to keep the report.
Id. At the time, SEC regulations provided that such information would be kept confidential. Id. at
1418 n.4.
12. The DOJ began to investigate Westinghouse in 1978. The DOJ's investigation explored
whether Westinghouse had made illegal payments to obtain contracts not only in the Philippines,
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agencies' investigations. 13 The district court affirmed the magistrate's
ruling that the disclosures resulted in a complete waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.' 4 Therefore, the Republic could obtain the requested
documents.15 Westinghouse petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the district court's order. 6 The Third Circuit
ruled that Westinghouse's disclosure had effected a complete waiver.17
The attorney-client privilege 8 prevents the disclosure of information
but also in other countries. The DOJ's investigation ended when Westinghouse entered into a plea
agreement concerning payments that the company admitted making in order to obtain business in
Egypt. Id. at 1419. After Marcos was deposed as President of the Phillipines in 1986, the DOJ
renewed its investigation of Westinghouse. Pursuant to the investigation, a grand jury subpoenaed
the reports from the earlier investigation. Id. After entering into a confidentiality agreement with
the DOJ, Westinghouse ultimately disclosed the documents to the grand jury. This agreement
provided:
That the [DOJ] review at Westinghouse counsel's office (but not keep copies of) attorney-
client privileged and work-product protected materials in the [the law firm's] files, that the
information contained therein would not be disclosed to anyone outside of the DOJ, and
that such review of the [law firm's] documents would not constitute a waiver of Westing-
house's work product and attorney-client privileges.
Id. at 1419 (citing 132 F.R.D. 384, 385-86 (D.N.J. 1991)).
13. Id. at 1418-19. The SEC and DOJ investigations followed press reports stating that West-
inghouse had bribed foreign officials to obtain part of the Philippine power plant contract. Id. at
1418.
14. Waiver results from partial disclosure of confidential information which would make it
unfair for the client to invoke the privilege thereafter. See CHARLES TIFFORD MCCORMICK, MC-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). See infra notes 23-30 and
accompanying text for discussion of the traditional waiver doctrine. See also infra notes 18-22 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the attorney-client privilege.
15. 132 F.R.D. at 388.
16. 951 F.2d at 1421.
17. Id. at 1431.
18. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 (Peter Tillers et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1961). The attorney-client privilege is the oldest common-law protection for confidential
communications. The privilege originally provided that the attorney's "oath and honor" allowed
him to refuse to disclose his client's secrets upon examination in court. Id. § 87. However, by the
eighteenth century the emphasis upon the code of honor had lessened and the ascertainment of truth
became a higher priority. Id. Thus, in the early 1700s the courts developed the modern attorney-
client privilege. This theory was aimed at protecting the client, rather than the attorney, and devel-
oped to encourage the client to fully disclose all information to the attorney. Id. § 2290.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which essentially codified the common-law attorney-client privi-
lege, provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdi-
vision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.
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given to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal assistance. 19 The
Essentially, Rule 501 incorporates state privilege rules to govern state claims and a federal common
law for federal claims. See Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1203
n.31 (citing 4 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS JOURNAL 5, 6 (Dec. 1979)).
As promulgated by the Supreme Court, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence set forth nine
distinct privileges. See RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 763 (1989). The proposed rule is a representative statement of the modem attorney-
client privilege. Iad Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 stated, in relevant part:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1) between himself or
his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between his lawyer
and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing an-
other in a matter of common interest, or (4) between representatives of the client or be-
tween the client and a representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the
client.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503. Although Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 was never en-
acted, it is often cited as a guideline regarding the scope of the privilege. See MCCORMICK, supra
note 14, § 87 ("A clear statement of the scope of the privilege is embodied in the Revised Uniform
Evidence Rules 502 (1986) .... except that deleted Federal Rule of Evidence 503 did not contain
[certain provisions] of the Revised Uniform Rule and except for insignificant stylistic differences, the
rules are the same."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Detroit, Michigan, August 1977, 434 F. Supp.
648, 650 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (concluding Congress' refusal to enact the rule as part of the Federal
Rules of Evidence does not diminish its value as a definition of the privilege).
When the proposed rules dealing with privilege were submitted to Congress, they generated sub-
stantial controversy. Disagreements emerged about the scope of some of the proposed privileges,
about whether the proposed list was sufficiently inclusive, and about the extent to which state or
federal rules of privilege should apply in diversity actions. Congress ultimately resolved this contro-
versy by deciding not to enact the proposed rules relating to privilege. See ALLEN & KUHNS, supra,
at 763. Congress did not reject the draft of Rule 503 because of substantive shortcomings, but rather
based on the theory that the common-law rules of privilege should not be articulated by a Federal
Rule. See In re Grand Jury, 434 F. Supp. at 650 n.1.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence mandate attorney-client confidentiality, the courts have
yet to recognize a constitutional right to the privilege. See Comment, supra, at 1203 n.37 (citing
Magida ex rel Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(finding that the privilege is not "sacrosanct," but rather it is a "product of legislation, without
constitutional guarantee"). Some have suggested, however, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
taken together, offer individual criminal defendants the attorney-client privilege. See Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 464, 486 (1977).
19. In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), the court
discussed the scope of the attorney-client privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be-
come a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the
bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a)
by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
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privilege exists to foster disclosure and trust between the attorney and
client. 20 Nineteenth-century courts used the attorney-client privilege to
encourage clients to disclose all the facts21 to their lawyers.22
Recognizing the discovery costs23 incurred in connection with the at-
Id. at 1358-59. A noted commentator has defined the common-law attomey-client privilege as
follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection may be waived.
WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2292.
The attorney-client privilege applies if the client reasonably believes that the person consulted is
an attorney, even though in fact the person is not. McCoRMIcK, supra note 14, § 88 (citing People
v. Barker, 27 N.W. 539 (Mich. 1886)). Communications in the course of preliminary discussion
with a view toward employing the lawyer are privileged even if the attorney is not retained. Id.
(citing In re DuPont's Estate, 140 P.2d 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)).
The privilege was developed to protect "only those disclosures... which might not have been
made absent the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
20. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2291; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981) (indicating that the attorney-client privilege exists solely "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980) (explaining that the privilege exists because the advocate needs to know everything that re-
lates to the client's reasons for seeking representation); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976) (explaining that the objective of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full disclosure by
clients); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege is grounded upon
"necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure").
21. See, eg., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (ex-
plaining if the rule required the communications to be subjected to examination and publication,
then a "practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance" would result).
22. See WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2291 ("The policy of the privilege has been plainly
grounded since the latter part of the 1700s on subjective considerations... [i.e., freedom of consulta-
tion]... Such is the modern theory.). See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp, 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D.
Conn. 1976) (noting that "[the purpose of the privilege is to insure that the client may confide in his
attorney to obtain legal advice"); Note, supra note 18, at 466.
The extent to which the attorney-client privilege actually benefits and promotes the attorney-client
relationship remains a source of academic dispute. See WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2291, at 553-54
("Mhe loss to the truth is comparatively small, in modern times ... [the privilege's] benefits are all
indirect and speculative, its obstruction is plain and concrete."). See also Note, supra note 18, at 470
("Clients seek out attorneys and will continue to do so largely because there is no ready substitute
for legal advice, and perhaps, because they realize that the costs of withholding information from
their legal representatives are likely to outweigh the consequences.").
23. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2291, at 554 (the privilege "is worth preserving for
the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth.");
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210 cmt. (1942) ("The social good derived from [the attorney-
client privilege] is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from suppression of the evidence").
As one commentator noted:
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torney-client privilege, courts construe the privilege narrowly24 and
strictly apply the "waiver" doctrine.25 A client who voluntarily discloses
confidential information2 6 to a third party27 waives the attorney-client
privilege with respect to that information. Thus, the waiver rule ensures
that the privilege is "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits
consistent with the logic of its principle." '28 The attorney-client privilege
is intended to protect "only those disclosures... which might not have
been made absent the privilege."29 When a client reveals privileged in-
formation to a third party, the rationale underlying the privilege no
The privilege tends to force litigants to duplicate their investigative efforts, thus increasing
the costs of discovery and litigation. More importantly, the attorney-client privilege...
removes from the judicial process evidence that might be relevant to the resolution of a
dispute, thus increasing the danger that cases will be wrongly decided for lack of
information.
Comment, supra note 18, at 1204-05.
24. See, eg., WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2292, at 554 (stating that the attorney-client privilege
"ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle"). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423
(3d Cir. 1991) (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation of Sun Co., 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir.
1979)); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Radi-
ant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
25. The waiver doctrine states that when a client voluntarily discloses privileged communica-
tions to a third party, the privilege is waived. See 8 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016, at 127 n.71 (1969) (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. EVID.
511) ("A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of a confidential matter
or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege volunta-
rily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter."). See also United States
v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 1990).
Courts have recognized several exceptions to the waiver doctrine. See WIGMORE, supra note 18,
§ 2301 (explaining that the waiver doctrine does not apply when information is disclosed to an agent
assisting the attorney in giving legal advice); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding client may disclose communications to co-defendants without waiving the privi-
lege). In each exception, the disclosed communication was made for the common purpose of ob-
taining informed legal advice.
Traditionally, waiver is legally defined as the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Knowledge or lack of
knowledge is unnecessary, however, for the attorney-client waiver doctrine to apply. See PROPOSED
FED. R. EVID. 511 advisory committee's note.
26. Significantly, protected confidential information in this context does not include facts-only
confidential communications. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp.
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
27. For the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, a third party is "one who stands in a
neutral or adverse position vis-a-vis the subject of the communication." In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated November 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. Comment, supra note 18, at 1207.
29. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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longer applies, and the privilege is waived.3"
The waiver rule's significance increased31 upon the advent of the SEC
Voluntary Disclosure Program. 32 Originally, the SEC's primary task was
to investigate corporations suspected of violating the Securities Exchange
Act.33 However, within the last twenty years the SEC has started to in-
vestigate and prosecute corporations that have allegedly bribed foreign
officials or made questionable election contributions.34 In an attempt to
alleviate the additional caseload, 35 the SEC developed the Voluntary Dis-
closure Program,36 which permits participating corporations to conduct
internal investigations of questionable business practices using their own
attorneys and resources.37 The corporations then report their findings to
the SEC and correct any problems uncovered during the investigation.38
The SEC and the participating corporations mutually benefit from the
program.39 Corporations benefit because the SEC offers them leniency
and the opportunity to avoid an intrusive investigation.'" The SEC bene-
30. See In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("The theoretical predicate underlying all recognized privileges is that secrecy and confidentiality are
necessary to promote the relationship fostered by the privilege. Once the secrecy or confidentiality is
destroyed by a voluntary disclosure to a third party, the rationale for granting the privilege in the
first instance no longer applies.") (citations omitted).
31. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concluding "the SEC's demand
for disclosure of underlying documentation implicated the attorney-client privilege and work-prod-
uct doctrine because every document involved in the investigation potentially was privileged."); Beth
S. Dorris, Note, The Limited Waiver Rule" Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 789, 797 (1984). Merely conducting internal investigations does not completely further the
SEC's enforcement needs; the SEC must examine all of the results to benefit. However, disclosing
information to the SEC constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the traditional
doctrine. Id.
32. For a detailed discussion of the development of the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program,
see In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 818-20.
33. Dorris, supra note 31, at 793.
34. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) (providing that a corporation which falls to report foreign
bribes to the SEC violates the Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2 (1988) (making
foreign bribes illegal).
35. Dorris, supra note 31, at 794.
36. Id. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 819.
37. 676 F.2d at 819. Ultimately, SEC turns over the information gathered during the investiga-
tion to the corporation's stockholders and the investing public. Id. at 891 n.104. However, the SEC
allows corporations to redact certain information. For example, a corporation may exclude "the
names of foreign nations and the identities of those who received bribes." Id.
38. Dorris, supra note 31, at 795. The SEC requires only the final report. Participating corpo-
rations are not required to present all investigative materials. Id. at 795 n.27.
39. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 819.
40. Id. However, the SEC does not guarantee lenient treatment; it still will seek appropriate
relief in egregious cases. Id. at 819 n.106.
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fits because it can fulfill its investigatory duties more cost-effectively. 41
The Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States42 broad-
ened the scope of a corporation's attorney-client privilege.43 Before
Upjohn,44 the majority of courts advocated the "control group" test
which provided that the privilege applied to only those corporate officers
having discretion to make decisions based on an attorney's advice.45 Re-
jecting this view, the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privi-
lege protected communications of all corporate employees. 46 This ruling
may have enhanced corporate participation in the SEC Voluntary Dis-
closure Program because corporations became more confident that the
privilege would protect most communications. 47
The development of the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program gave
rise to the limited waiver rule, which provides that the disclosure of in-
formation to an investigatory government agency does not constitute a
41. Id. at 800, 819. See Dorris, supra note 31, at 794-95.
42. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
43. See, e.g., John Doe v. United States (In re John Doe Corp.), 675 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir.
1982) (recognizing that despite the ancient origins of the privilege, "its applicability and scope in the
context of attorneys representing corporate clients" is a relatively new subject of litigation); Donis,
supra note 31, at 795 ("The Supreme Court recognized this practice [SEC's Voluntary Disclosure
Programs] and its importance in Upjohn Co. v. United States.").
44. In Upjohn, the defendant corporation allegedly bribed foreign government officials to obtain
business. Upjohn conducted an internal investigation, 449 U.S. at 386, and voluntarily submitted a
preliminary report to the SEC and the IRS disclosing the questionable payments. Id. at 387.
Shortly thereafter, the IRS demanded production of the report's supporting documents. Upjohn
asserted the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 388.
45. Id. at 392-93. The Supreme Court articulated the control group test:
The question is, Is it the corporation which is seeking the lawyer's advice when the asserted
privileged communication is made?, [and] the most satisfactory solution... is that if the
employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corpora-
tion may take upon the advice of the attorney ... then.., the privilege will apply.
Id. at 390 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 943 (1963)).
46. 449 U.S. at 397. The court employed the "subject matter test." See Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970). Under this test, the attorney-client privilege is
extended to any lower level employee's communication to the corporation's attorney where the cor-
poration sought the attorney's advice on the subject matter of the communication and the communi-
cation concerns matters within the scope of the employee's corporate duties. Id. at 491. Although
the Upjohn Court did not explicitly adopt the subject matter test, it indicated that the attorney-client
privilege should apply to most corporate communications. 449 U.S. at 391-93.
47. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1200-01 (allowing the client to assert the attorney-client
privilege to communications between attorneys and low level employees of the corporation, the
Upjohn court has encouraged increased "self-policing of corporate malfeasance through the use of
corporate counsel").
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waiver of the attorney-client privilege.48 At first, the courts disfavored
the theory.49 In In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 50 a
district court in New York rejected the limited waiver rule, and instead
applied the traditional waiver theory."1 The court reasoned that
although a witness might be less likely to cooperate with the SEC with-
out the rule, this factor alone failed to justify departing from the well-
established traditional waiver rule.52
However, the Penn Central decision did not mark the end of the lim-
ited waiver rule. Four years later, the Eighth Circuit upheld the rule in
Diversified Industries v. Meredith. 53 Diversified conducted an internal in-
vestigation which revealed that its agents had bribed other businesses'
purchasing agents.54 The law firm conducting the investigation for Di-
versified prepared a memorandum which it submitted to the SEC.55 A
rival corporation subsequently brought suit against Diversified and
sought to compel discovery of the memorandum.56 Diversified argued
that the memorandum was protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege.57 The Eighth Circuit agreed, expressing a belief that the policy of
upholding the effectiveness of the SEC's Disclosure Program outweighed
the parties' interest in discovery.58
In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Shamrock
48. See, eg., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 685-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
49. Comment, supra note 18, at 1210.
50. 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Penn Central, the SEC investigated a corporation and
its affiliates with regard to a debenture fund. Id. at 457. An attorney for the corporation testified
before the SEC, and the plaintiff requested the transcript and supporting documents from this inves-
tigation in discovery. Id. at 456. The corporation asserted the attorney-client privilege and the
limited waiver theory. Id. at 462.
51. Id. at 462-64.
52. Id. at 464. The court noted that "it is hornbook law that the voluntary disclosure or con-
sent to disclosure of a communication, otherwise subject to a claim of privilege, effectively waives the
privilege." Id. at 463 (quoting McCoitCim, supra note 14, § 97).
53. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
54. Id. at 600. In the course of litigation during a proxy fight, discovery revealed that Diversi-
fied may have established and maintained a "slush fund" which it used to bribe purchasing agents of
other business entities, including the plaintiff. Id.
55. Id. at 611.
56. Id. at 606. The rival corporation was Weatherhead Corporation, a brass manufacturing
corporation with its principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio. Id. at 607.
57. Id. at 599.
58. The Eighth Circuit noted that an opposite decision may frustrate the "developing proce-
dure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order
to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers." Id. at 611. See In re LTB See.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (upholding limited waiver rule); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust
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Broadcasting Co., 5 9 a district court in New York added a scienter ele-
ment to the limited waiver theory.' The Teachers court held that the
plaintiff waived its attorney-client privilege because it had not asserted
the privilege in response to a SEC subpoena.61 Because the corporation
did not prove that it intended to retain its attorney-client privilege when
it disclosed certain documents, the court deemed it waived.62 The Teach-
ers decision essentially adopted the limited waiver rule articulated in Di-
versified, but added a surmountable hurdle-an intent to retain the
attorney-client privilege.63
The limited waiver rule has not gained universal acceptance.61 In Per-
mian Corp. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's ration-
ale in Diversified Industries and flatly rejected the limited waiver rule.61
In Permian, the SEC obtained confidential corporate documents to facili-
tate its investigation regarding the adequacy of the corporation's registra-
tion statement.66 In return, the SEC agreed that the corporation could
assert the attorney-client privilege to prevent the SEC from disclosing the
Co., 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F.
Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (same).
59. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
60. Id. at 641 (explaining that it is proper to require a client who wants to retain the attorney-
client privilege to "take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality").
61. d at 646.
62. The Teachers court stated that "disclosure to the SEC should be deemed a complete waiver
unless the right to assert the privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time
disclosure is made." Id at 644-45. The court believed that the party was required to express intent
to retain the privilege. See Martin P. Hicks, Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Upon Voluntary Disclosure to the SEC, 50 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 963 (1982).
63. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1213, (noting that the Teachers ruling was effectively the
same as Diversified, because under this ruling all parties would choose to retain the privilege and
obtain an express reservation of the producing parties' claim of privilege).
64. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding information
revealed to SEC is no longer protected by privilege in a later grand jury proceeding); In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting limited waiver of work-product privilege theory
in grand jury context); In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (same); In re Penn
Central Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also supra notes 50-52 (dis-
cussing Penn Central); cf In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting limited
waiver rule for corporate documents disclosed to underwriter for commercial purposes).
65. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 1216. The defendant made over 1.2 million pages of documents available to the SEC.
The sheer volume of this response impaired its usefulness to the SEC. To avoid delay, the defend-
ant's counsel negotiated with the SEC staff and a former adversary and devised a plan that would
allow the SEC to obtain confidential documents directly and expeditiously from the former adver-
sary. Id.
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information to a third party.6 7 When the Department of Energy later
attempted to obtain the documents, Permian asserted the attorney-client
privilege.6" Refusing to apply the limited waiver rule, the D.C. Circuit
held that Permian waived its privilege when it submitted the documents
to the SEC.6 9
The Permian court rejected the limited waiver doctrine for three rea-
sons.70 First, the court noted that the rule did not advance attorney-
client communication interests because the justification for the privilege
disappears once it appears the client did not desire secrecy.7' Second, the
court asserted a "fairness" argument: the attorney-client privilege should
not enable litigants to "pick and choose" third parties to whom it will
disclose confidential information.7" Third, the court refused to embrace
the Eighth Circuit's theory that the rule is necessary to promote the
SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Program.73 The court reasoned that by al-
lowing the SEC access while denying access to the Department of En-
ergy, the corporation would be able to select who had access to
information.74
In Westinghouse v. Republic of the Philippines,75 the Third Circuit
joined the D.C. Circuit in rejecting the limited waiver rule.76 The Third
67. Id. The SEC agreed not to:
deliver any of the Documents to any person other than a member of the Commission or the
Staff or any other government agencies, offices or bodies or to the Congress for a reasonable
period of time after notice ... of the Staff's intention to deliver the documents to such
person.
Id.
68. Id. at 1217. The Department of Energy was investigating the corporation's compliance
with petroleum price regulations. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1220-22.
71. Id. at 1220-21. The court doubted that a limited waiver rule would further the interests of
the "common law privilege for confidential communications" between a client and a lawyer. Id. at
1220.
72. Id. at 1221. The court reasoned that it cannot adopt a rule that allows the client to choose
"among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already
compromised for his own benefit." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1221-22.
75. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1424-25. The Westinghouse court referred to the rule as the "selective waiver rule."
The court stated that the term "limited" refers to two separate kinds of waivers-selective waivers
and partial waivers. The court found that selective waiver allows the client who has already revealed
privileged information to one party to continue to assert the privilege against others. In contrast,
partial waiver allows a client who has disclosed part of a privileged communications to continue to
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Circuit agreed with the Permian court's argument that the limited
waiver rule does not serve the interests underlying the attorney-client
privilege.77 The court noted that the only exception to the traditional
waiver doctrine exists when the information is disclosed to obtain in-
formed legal advice.78 Because the limited waiver rule protects disclo-
sures made for different purposes, the court was unwilling to recognize
limited waiver as an exception to the traditional waiver rule.79
In declining to adopt the limited waiver rule, however, the court did
not rely on Permian's "fairness doctrine."80 Rather, the Third Circuit
found no "unfairness" in the doctrine because a private litigant who dis-
closes privileged information to a government agency is no worse off in
subsequent proceedings than had disclosure to the agency not occurred. 1
Moreover, the court rejected the policy argument that the limited
waiver rule encourages corporations to conduct internal investigations.8 2
According to the Third Circuit, recognition of this alternative policy
would circumvent the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege
and create an entirely new privilege.83 The court was reluctant to take
such a step in light of the Supreme Court's repeated command for courts
to act cautiously in recognizing new privileges.84 Furthermore, the court
noted that a new privilege must "promote sufficiently important interests
to outweigh the need for probative evidence."85 The court did not be-
lieve that the promotion of voluntary cooperation in government investi-
gations outweighed the need for probative evidence.86
The Third Circuit was similarly unpersuaded by the Diversified court's
argument that the limited waiver rule is necessary to encourage volun-
assert the privilege against the rest of the same privileged information. Id. at 1423 n.7. However, in
order to avoid confusion, this Comment will use the term "limited waiver" rather than "selective
waiver."
77. Id. at 1425. The court believed that limited waiver will not encourage complete disclosure
to a client's lawyer to obtain informed legal assistance. Instead, because it only encourages one to
voluntarily disclose information to government agencies, the limited waiver rule extends the attor-
ney-client privilege beyond its purpose. Id.
78. Id
79. Id. See supra note 77.
80. 951 F.2d at 1426. "Our rejection of the [limited] waiver rule does not depend, however, on
the second reason the D.C. Circuit gave in Permian for rejecting Diversified." Id.
81. Id. at 1426 n.13.
82. Id. at 1425.
83. Id.
84. Id "Privileges obstruct the truth-finding process." Id.
85. Id (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
86. Id. at 1425-26.
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tary cooperation with government investigations.8 7 The court empha-
sized that Westinghouse chose to cooperate with the SEC and DOJ
despite uncertainty surrounding the validity of the limited waiver rule.88
The court also noted that numerous corporations had opted to disclose
information to the SEC despite the lack of an established privilege.89
The Westinghouse court was reluctant to recognize a privilege that
Congress had expressly considered and rejected.90 In 1984 Congress
considered and rejected an amendment to the Securities and Exchange
Act that would have established a limited waiver rule pertaining to docu-
ments disclosed to the SEC. 91 Finally, the court rejected Westinghouse's
argument that it did not waive the privilege because it reasonably ex-
pected that the SEC and DOJ would maintain the confidentiality of the
information the corporation disclosed.92 The court found this fact irrele-
vant, noting that under traditional waiver doctrine, voluntary disclosure
to a third party waives the privilege even if the third party agrees not to
disclose the communication to anyone else.93
The Third Circuit correctly rejected the limited waiver rule. First, as
the Permian court noted, the rationale underlying the limited waiver rule
is wholly inconsistent with the policy underlying the attorney-client priv-
ilege.94 Significantly, the widely recognized exceptions to the traditional
waiver rule have one common denominator. Each furthers the goal un-
derlying the attorney-client privilege-obtaining informed legal advice.95
The limited waiver rule, on the other hand, serves a different goal-en-
couraging corporate participation in voluntary government investiga-
tions.96 Although this goal has merit, it does not justify carving a new
exception to the traditional waiver rule.9 7
Furthermore, the Diversified court's assertion that the rule is necessary
87. Id. at 1426.
88. Id. The court noted that at the time Westinghouse disclosed the information to the DOJ
only one appellate court had adopted the limited waiver rule, while another circuit had "trenchantly
rejected" the rule. Id.
89. Id. (citing Dorris, supra note 31, at 822). The court noted that over 425 corporations
participated in the SEC's program in 1979 alone. Id. at 1426.
90. Id. at 1425.
91. Id. (citing 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 461 (March 2, 1984)).
92. Id. at 1426-27.
93. Id. at 1427. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 19-22, 71, 77-78 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 19-22. See also Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424.
96. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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to ensure cooperation between corporations and investigatory govern-
ment agencies is unpersuasive. 9 Indeed, Westinghouse cooperated with
the SEC despite legal uncertainty regarding the limited waiver rule.99 In
addition, over 400 corporations participated in the SEC's Voluntary Dis-
closure Program although the rule's validity was far from established.1 "0
The opportunity to avoid an intrusive formal investigation and obtain
lenient treatment from the SEC 1° 1 provides sufficient incentive for corpo-
rations to cooperate without the need for limited waiver. Therefore, the
primary "benefit" of the limited waiver rule is tenuous, because corpora-
tions will likely cooperate with the SEC absent the rule.102 Accordingly,
the rule is difficult to justify in light of its inevitable discovery costs. 103
Moreover, the limited waiver rule's effects are devastating to non-SEC
enforcement of the securities laws. For example, the rule greatly ham-
pers private actions against corporations, a primary enforcement and de-
terrent tool against securities violations." 4 Shareholders and other
litigants are forced to duplicate the corporation's investigative work
given to the SEC. 05 The prohibitive cost of such discovery efforts ulti-
mately discourages private actions. 106 Likewise, government agencies to
which the privileged information is not disclosed suffer because they can-
not receive the information disclosed to other agencies.' 0 7 For instance,
if a corporation could disclose information to the SEC, yet prohibit the
SEC from sharing the information with other agencies, the company
could easily frustrate government efficiency.10 8
Finally, as the Pennian court indicated, the limited waiver rule per-
mits corporations to use the attorney-client privilege as a sword rather
than a shield.109 The rule permits corporations to waive and retain the
98. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
99. 951 F.2d at 1425.
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 23.
104. See Dorris, supra note 31, at 814. Congress expressly provided for private lawsuits in the
securities acts. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1988). See Dorris, supra note 31, at 815 n.118.
105. See Dorris, supra note 31, at 814-15.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 814.
108. If government agencies cannot share information with each other, they will be forced to
expend unnecessary tiie and money duplicating discovery efforts.
109. See Permian v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The attorney-client
privilege is not designed for... tactical employment.").
[Vol. 71:467
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/11
LIMITED WAIVER
attorney-client privilege for their benefit.1 " However, it inappropriately
permits the use of the attorney-client privilege as an offensive litigation
tool. 11I
The Third Circuit properly rejected the limited waiver rule. The logi-
cal reasoning of the Westinghouse decision provides a sound basis for
other circuits or the Supreme Court to follow when faced with the issue.
Jill A. Hornstein
110. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Referring to the
limited waiver rule, the court did not want a rule that allows an attorney-client privilege in instances
when disclosure is beneficial to the client while asserting it in circumstances when nondisclosure is
advantageous. Id. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
111. The attorney-client privilege was intended to promote full disclosure to a client's attorney,
not to strategically prevent an opposing party's discovery. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1226-27.
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